Views on Artifacts | first: 2011-10-12 last: 2011-12-16 |
The recent philosophical literature offers a range of views on artifacts.
The main purpose of this section is to make a quick scan of various views on artifacts
as an input of the more detailed analyses of artifact use and design. Many
philosophical views on artifacts focus explicit or implicit on the ontology
of artifacts often in contrast with the ontology of natural things. [Houkes
2009] Although the purpose here is not to cover the metaphysical aspects,
some concepts are worth considering. First a quick survey of various
approaches is given.
Following Gergely Csibra and György
Gergely's hierarchical levels of artifacts, artifacts here are defined
as reusable objects with a value. This
excludes for example the tree branch selected, or broken to the right length, by a chimpanzee
to collect termites. [the aspect of value is worked out in
artifact design/value]
In philosophy of technology it is quite common to speak about theories of artifacts. However, this suggests different theories to be mutually excluding. In my more phenomenological approach views on artifacts is more appropriate as I do see these to be often complementary, related to the kind of analysis.
Views on artifacts | Functional
views Intentional views Triple stances Combined views Conclusion |
Judit Futó, Téglas, Csibra and Gergely show that structuring in relation to function is not related to language but seems to be a basic cognitive mechanism that can already be observed with preverbal infants:
– within the domain of artifact understanding – function demonstration can induce kind assignment and object individuation in 10-month-old infants even in the absence of linguistic labeling. [Futo2010: 8]
Beth Preston states that a full fledged function theory of artifacts ought also to account for:Multi realizability: comparing the intentionalist view with reproduction views notices that typically artifacts are multi realizable with the example of spoons have been made from wood, shell, horn, bone, pottery, porcelain, plastic, metal;
Multi utilizability: Many artifacts are designed to serve a
particular
function, but then although not intended for, they can be used for other
functions, like an umbrella, designed to protect
against the rain but it can also be used against sunlight, or as a weapon. An
other example close to daily use: the spoon used to open a cocoa tins.*
[Preston 2009: 214 - 215] Considering multifunctionality, I had in mind the screwdriver to used for other functions like opening a
paint tin.
Peter-Paul Verbeek articulates this approach more explicitly or even
extremely as the ultimate users view:
The artifacts do not have an essence, they should not be considered outside the users context, they are what they become in usage. [Verbeek 2000: 134]
I think we should add:
Multi functionality: Some artifacts are designed to provide more functions. The Swiss army knife might be the most typical example. Here designers have to find the balance between adding more functions against higher costs and the possible effect on usability.
Concurrent functionality: Many artifacts are characterized by
more than one function being applicable at the same time. A good example of
concurrent functionality is a uniform, these serve the function of clothing,
but have a specific communication function, identify the group and often
even the function and rank of the person wearing the uniform.
(Preston refers to this example of uniforms used by
Michael Schiffer, but under the category of multi utilizable).
In a way most clothes have such kind of concurrent function.
An other example is that of a house, or a building in general as
discussed in the section value of artifact design. [see
artifact design/value]
Status functions: Many artifacts will have a status functions, but for a category of artifacts the status function is the main function with paper money as a typical example given by Preston in her analyses of Searle`s view. The status function can relate to a value, but also just have a meaning as for example traffic signs, icon signs for exit etc. The assignment of a status creates what Searle calls an institutional act, a fact which exists only through collective human agency.
Phantom functions: Beth Preston points to a very particular kind of function: a function that is not real. Examples mentioned are: drugs that are known not to cure certain illnesses and amulets for protection against the "evil eye". I would say a placebo is also an interesting example also if has a kind of "meta function" namely to have a phantom function.
Above references and observations seem good reasons to support the functional approach. However specifically in the metaphysical position a set of problems arise. The functional approach inevitable leads to the issues of defect, broken down artifact and malfunctioned artifacts. (See for a detailed analysis about malfunctioning Misrepresenting and Malfunctioning K. Neander (1995) Several authors require of a theory of artifacts that the question is answered whether a defect artifact is to be considered as an artifact. [see intentional view for an answer]
Proper function: The notion of proper function, introduced by Ruth Millikan in the domain of biology, is used to overcome the issue of not/mal function of artifacts. However in most cases the use of proper function moves into the intentional view on artifacts [Preston 2009: 218-227]
Daniel C. Dennett introduces a specific intentional view of artifacts with
his well known introduction of the triple stances towards the world:
the physical stance, the intentional stance and the
design stance.
In True Believers (chapter 2 of his book Intentional
stance) as a replacement of his article Intentional systems) in 1971.
[Dennett 1987: 3] Dennett introduces a philosophy of mind perspective,
while the above mentioned approaches are mostly ontologically oriented.
The intentional stance is based on the observation that we as humans tend to
ascribe intentional attitudes not only to biological subjects but also to
complex artifacts.(id.: 22-23) While clever engineers would view a simple
(not microprocessor controlled) thermostat with a physical stance ordinary
users might view the thermostat at first view as a device with an intention.
Unfortunately, despite its crucial role, Dennett is terribly unclear
about what exactly the design stance is, and he gives contradictory clues as
to
what exactly its role is supposed to be, especially when it comes to the
interpretation
of technical artifacts. [Amerongen 2008: 83] van
Amerongen concludes that also, Dennett`s introduction of
the notion of optimality does not provide a good solution.
The other is related to the relation between the intentional stance and the design stance:
If intentions have to be understood in terms of designs, it seems terribly
circular to claim in addition that design has to be understood in terms of
(designer) intentions. [id.: 101]
In so far as technical artifacts are physical structures they fit into the
physical conception of the world; in so far as they have
intentionality-related functions, they fit into the intentional conception.
Both conceptions are necessary for characterizing technical artifacts.
[t]he best way to conceive the functions of artifacts, is to regard the notion of function as a bridge concept that relates the physical and intentional domain. [Kroes 2006:2]
But they acknowledge that there is no generally accepted theory of function available in literature. (This probably is due to the attempts to combine the concept of function in the domain of biology with that in the domain of technology)